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ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE 
TREATY OF WAITANGI SETTLEMENT 
PROCESS 
Jessica Andrew* 
This paper looks at administrative review of the negotiation and settlement process for Treaty of 
Waitangi historical claims.  The foundation is an analysis of the current treatment of these claims 
within the political arena, the Waitangi Tribunal and the courts.  This includes a detailed analysis 
of the effectiveness of political and Waitangi Tribunal responses, and a hard look at the validity of 
the courts' continued stance that Treaty settlement cases are non-justiciable. 
Due to the non-binding nature of its recommendations, the effectiveness of the Waitangi Tribunal 
depends largely on the existence of political buy-in from the Executive and political branches of 
government.  Analysis of the evidence illustrates that this buy-in is lacking.  Despite the intensity of 
Waitangi Tribunal scrutiny in this area, very few meaningful outcomes are being achieved.   
Finally, the discussion of the courts' response to Treaty settlement claims looks closely at the 
concept of non-justiciability and the courts' continued application of broad precedents without 
meaningful analysis.  This paper argues that a thorough understanding of the cases brought before 
the courts illuminates differences between those precedents being applied and the cases now being 
heard.  Declaring a case non-justiciable has serious consequences and should not be done lightly. 
I INTRODUCTION  
…the settlement of historical claims is not to pay off for the past, even were that possible, but to take 
those steps necessary to remove outstanding prejudice and prevent similar prejudice from arising; for the 
only practical settlement between peoples is one that achieves a reconciliation in fact.1  
New Zealand has pinned many of its hopes for meaningful reconciliation of the issues facing 
Māori on the current process of negotiation and settlement of historical claims arising under the 
  
*  Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. 
1  Waitangi Tribunal The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi: Wai 143 (GP Publications, Wellington, 1996) 
315. 
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Treaty of Waitangi. However, what has only recently come to the public's attention is the fact that 
the current process of negotiation of settlements faces a number of significant challenges it is 
currently unable to effectively deal with. The result is significant prejudice to affected Māori 
groups. The perpetuation of these issues and the continued utilisation of flawed processes by Crown 
administrators raise a number of serious questions about effective accountability under the Treaty of 
Waitangi, including the Crown's ability to properly meet its obligation of active protection. 
This paper is an analysis of the treatment of Treaty settlement issues within the three main areas 
of review: the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, and the political arena. What this should not be taken 
for is a review of the appropriate forum for the claims of Māori and indigenous peoples generally to 
be heard.2 Rather, this is a specific discussion of where issues that arise as a result of the existing 
Treaty settlement policy should be reviewed. This paper looks at the impact of the Executive's 
actions on the rights and interests of Māori. As famously analogised by Cohen, issues of indigenous 
rights are the miner's canary in democratic accountability: a failure to effectively protect indigenous 
interests indicates fundamental failures in the democratic and political processes.3 By analysing the 
government's responses within this limited but crucial area, it is possible to achieve a broader 
analysis of democratic accountability mechanisms both generally and within the constitutional 
milieu of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
After providing background to the New Zealand Treaty of Waitangi context, this paper focuses 
on a detailed analysis of the Waitangi Tribunal's role within Treaty settlement review. This includes 
an examination of the impact of Waitangi Tribunal review. Following from this is a study of the 
courts' response to these issues, in particular the legitimacy of their repeated rejection of these 
claims as non-justiciable. Finally, this paper concludes by scrutinising the acceptability of the 
current state of affairs within our constitutional framework.  
  
2  There is some excellent literature on this topic, particularly in the Canadian context. See Catherine Bell and 
Michael Asch "Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent in Aboriginal Rights Litigation" in 
Michael Asch (ed) Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for 
Difference (UBC Press, Vancouver, 1997) 38; Kerry Wilkins Advancing Aboriginal Claims: 
Visions/Strategies/Directions (Purich Publishing Ltd, Saskatoon, 2004); Joseph Eliot Magnet Litigating 
Aboriginal Culture (Juriliber, Edmonton, 2005). 
3  Felix S Cohen "The Erosion of Indigenous Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study of Bureaucracy" (1952-53) 62 
Yale LJ 348, 390. 
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II TREATY OF WAITANGI  
New Zealand is relatively unique in having one central constitutional document that largely 
governs the relationship between the Crown and Māori, the indigenous peoples of New Zealand.4 
This document is Te Tiriti o Waitangi, or the Treaty of Waitangi (the Treaty). 
Signed on 6 February 1840, the Treaty guaranteed Māori the right of "te tino Rangatiratanga o 
rātou whenua o rātou kāinga me o rātou taonga katoa"5 (unqualified exercise of their chieftainship 
over their lands, villages, and all their treasures)6 in return for the Crown gaining "kāwanatanga" 7 
(complete government).8 It is a compact that allows the Crown the right to govern, while preserving 
Māori control over their land and treasures.  
Due to the differences between the English and Māori texts of the Treaty and the lack of detail 
in the document itself, interpreting the Treaty is a difficult task.9 In order to help overcome the 
resulting difficulties in applying the Treaty, a number of principles have been developed. They are 
an attempt to clarify the rights and obligations of each of the Treaty partners.10  Although the 
Waitangi Tribunal has the authority to determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty, 11  the 
principles enunciated by the Court of Appeal in the 1987 case of New Zealand Maori Council v 
Attorney-General (Lands case)12 remain the most compelling and utilised articulation of the content 
of the Treaty guarantee. 13  These principles are derived from the fact the Treaty signifies a 
  
4  Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand's Constitution and Government (4 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) 333-4; Office of Treaty Settlements Ka tika ā muri, ka tika ā 
mua: Healing the past, building a future (Office of Treaty Settlements, Wellington, 2004) 11 [Red Book]. 
5  Treaty of Waitangi, art 2. Note: this is not exactly the text used in the original Treaty of Waitangi, but has 
been adapted slightly to modern usage. 
6  Hugh Kawharu Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1989) 319-20. 
7  Treaty of Waitangi, art 1. 
8  Kawharu, above n 6, 319-20. See for example Peter Shand "Fixing Settlement: An Analysis of Government 
Policy for Settling Tiriti Grievances" (1996-1999) 8 Auck ULR 739. 
9  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 663 (CA) Cooke P [Lands case]. 
10  See Robin Cooke "Introduction" (1990) NZULR 14. 
11  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 5. 
12  Lands case, above n 9, 704 Casey J. 
13  See Judge Carrie Wainwright "The Lands Case 20 Years On: Its Influence on the Waitangi Tribunal" (In 
Good Faith Symposium, Dunedin, 29 June 2007) 2 ["Influence on the Waitangi Tribunal"]; Jacinta Ruru 
"Treaty of Waitangi Principles 20 Years On" [2007] NZLJ 87. Other versions of the Treaty principles have 
been articulated, including the publication of five principles by the Labour Government in 1989, see Palmer 
and Palmer, above n 4, 334-336. Within the Treaty settlement process the Office of Treaty Settlements has 
also set out a number of specific principles by which it is guided in its work: Red Book, above n 4, 30. 
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relationship "akin to partnership".14 They include: a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown (which 
results in the obligation of active protection), full spirit of co-operation, upholding the honour of the 
Crown, and the provision of fair and reasonable redress.15  
III NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT PROCESS  
A Creation of the Waitangi Tribunal 
During the 1960s and 1970s New Zealand saw the rise of a generation of protestors who sought 
to bring Māori indigenous rights to the forefront of national attention.16 The resulting increase in 
national awareness of Māori issues combined with a number of other factors present at the time to 
force the government to acknowledge the issues of Māori and take action.17 
The creation of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 heralded a new phase of more responsive 
government. It was initially formed to only deal with contemporary claims. The Tribunal was to 
hear claims by any Māori individual or group that any action by the Crown had resulted, or would 
result, in a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi.18 Despite the fact that few recognised its significance 
at the time, the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal was a watershed moment; the beginning of a 
journey towards a society that placed much greater value on Māori issues.19 Whether one saw the 
creation of the Tribunal as a constructive path forward, or simply a "pressure-reducing valve",20 the 
Tribunal was an important acknowledgement that "all was not well". 
From these relatively understated beginnings through until 1982, the Tribunal did very little, and 
therefore was given very little attention by both Māori and government.21 It was not until 1985 that 
  
14  Lands case, above n 9, 704 Casey J. 
15  Ibid, 664-6 Cooke P.  
16  Known as the Māori Renaissance. See E Taihakurei Durie and Gordon S Orr "The Role of the Waitangi 
Tribunal and the Development of a Bicultural Jurisprudence" (1990) 14 NZULR 62, 62; Claudia Orange An 
Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2004) 136-7. 
17  Orange, ibid. 
18  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss 5 and 6; Hon M Rata (10 September 1975) 401 NZPD 4342-4346. 
19  Durie and Orr, above n 16, 144. 
20  Judge Carrie Wainwright "What is the Job of the Waitangi Tribunal (And Other Questions…)" (Waitangi 
Tribunal Conference, NZLS Conference, 17-18 November 2005) 3 ["What is the Job of the Waitangi 
Tribunal?"]. 
21  There were only two reports released by the Waitangi Tribunal before 1982: Waitangi Tribunal Fisheries 
Regulations Hawke Report: Wai 1 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1978); Waitangi Tribunal Report of 
the Waitangi Tribunal on the Waiau Pa Power Station Claim: Wai 2 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 
1978). See Richard P Boast "The Waitangi Tribunal: "Conscience of the Nation", or Just Another Court?" 
(1993) 16 UNSWLJ 223, 226; Richard Boast and Deborah Edmunds "The Legacy of Maori Council and the 
Struggle for Redress: Perspectives from Practice" (In Good Faith Symposium, Otago University, 29 June 
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the Tribunal was given the jurisdiction to hear claims arising from 1840 onwards. It was with that 
jurisdictional extension (and contemporaneous amendments to the nature and extent of the 
Tribunal's administrative functions) that it became the body recognisable today.22 The Tribunal 
became a body empowered to "propose a bicultural approach to lawmaking and administration and 
to the formation and delivery of public policy and services."23 
B Creation of the Settlement Process 
The creation of a specialist Tribunal, now with retrospective jurisdiction, was a clear 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the historical claims of Māori. By doing this the Crown had 
now completely opened the Pandora's box that is the Treaty of Waitangi, whereas previously the lid 
had only been given fleeting and intermittent moments ajar. It was quickly evident that the Crown 
did not intend to leave the process of reconciliation to simple compliance with Waitangi Tribunal 
recommendations. Already two large iwi were in negotiations with the Crown (Ngāi Tahu and 
Tainui), and the fisheries settlement was to be signed in 1992.24 It was essential that the Crown 
formulate a process whereby the claims reported on by the Tribunal could be settled, and the 
grievance that was being aired could be healed.  
Such a process was developed by a group of Crown officials during the early 1990s, culminating 
in the release of the now infamous Crown Proposal for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims 
in 1994.25 The proposal was heavily condemned by Māori, not least for the inclusion of the "fiscal 
envelope" – a proposal to set a one billion dollar cap on the total available funds for settlement of 
claims.26 Much of the criticism focused on the process by which the government developed the 
policy. It was developed in a "climate of secrecy and unilateral declaration" which undermined the 
good faith and partnership foundations essential to a meaningful settlement process.27 Despite these 
  
2007); Mason Durie Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga: The Politics of Māori Self-Determination (Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1998) 185 [Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga]. 
22  Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985; (6 August 1985) 465 NZPD 6059-6084. 
23  Durie and Orr, above n 16, 62. 
24  Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga, above n 21, 188; see (6 August 1985) 465 NZPD 6059-6084 (Hon K T Wetere, 
Mr Peters and Mr Graham in particular). 
25  Office of Treaty Settlements Crown Proposal for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims: Detailed 
Proposal (Office of Treaty Settlements, Wellington, December 1994). See Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga, ibid, 
188-89. 
26  See Office of Treaty Settlements Report of Submissions: Crown Proposals for the Treaty of Waitangi 
Claims (Office of Treaty Settlements, Wellington, December 1995); Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga, ibid, 190-
94. 
27  M H Durie and S Asher "The Hirangi Hui: A Report Concerning the Governments Proposal for the 
Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims and Related Constitutional Matters" (Hirangi Marae, Turangi, 28 
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criticisms the policy was implemented without substantial amendment,28 although notably the fiscal 
envelope was officially abandoned.29  The settlement process is now managed by the Office of 
Treaty Settlements (OTS),30 which negotiates all claims on behalf of the Crown. The Office is 
overseen by the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Settlements. Within the field of executive 
action, the negotiation process is relatively unique in that it is guided solely by a policy statement 
and absent any controlling legislation. The current policy statement, Ka tika ā muri, ka tika ā mua: 
Healing the past, building a future (Red Book) was released in 2004. Although extensive at first 
glance, it is in fact an incomplete guide to the negotiation process. Many gaps exist and some areas 
are vague and uncertain, creating a process that is far from transparent and accessible.31  
The initial vision was of a settlement process that would work in tandem with the Waitangi 
Tribunal, with claimants going into negotiations once Tribunal investigation was complete. This has 
not proven to be the reality, with many claimants opting for the "direct negotiations" path, 
sidestepping the Tribunal process altogether. The original intention to combine the two processes is 
evident in the fact that the OTS still requires claimants to have a claim lodged with the Waitangi 
Tribunal before it will begin pre-negotiation discussions.  
The settlement process is focused on a number of important milestones that claimants and the 
Crown work towards. Where no Tribunal report exists, the initial steps may take longer as more 
research is required. Aside from this, there is very little difference between the direct negotiations 
path and entering negotiations after receiving a Waitangi Tribunal report. The main steps are as 
follows:32 
a. Register claim with Waitangi Tribunal 
b. Establish large natural group 
c. Mandate 
d. Terms of Negotiation 
  
January 1995) 4. See Shand, above n 8, 751; Craig Coxhead "Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final, 
or Fatally Flawed?" (1997) 17 NZULR 13, 24.  
28  John H Roberts Politics not Justice: The Government's Treaty Settlements Policy (Joint Methodist 
Presbyterian Public Questions Committee, Wellington, 1999) 6; Shand, above n 8, 751; Coxhead, above n 
27, 25. 
29  Red Book, above n 4, 87. 
30  Established as a separate unit of the Ministry of Justice in 1994. 
31  See generally Crown Forestry Rental Trust Māori Experiences of the Direct Negotiation Process (Crown 
Forestry Rental Trust, Wellington, 2003); Coxhead, above n 27. 
32  See Red Book, above n 4. 
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e. Agreement in Principle  
f. Deed of Settlement 
g. Ratification  
h. Implementation (legislation) 
This is not the place to expound in detail the positive and negative aspects of the settlement 
process, despite the unfortunate lack of informed academic commentary on the topic.33 However, it 
is important to acknowledge and provide some background to the mounting discontent with the 
Treaty settlement process. It is this background that explains the increase in the number of cases 
being brought and Waitangi Tribunal reports being released on the process. 
C Main Criticisms   
Criticisms of the Treaty settlement process and OTS centre on (but are not limited to) a small 
number of key issues. The first of these is the Crown's policy of only negotiating with large natural 
groups. This policy provides that in order to ensure the most time and resource-efficient settlements, 
the Crown will only accept "large natural groups" into negotiations.34  The policy was adopted 
internally after the formulation of the 1994 policy, and as a result has never been open for 
consultation. 35  Furthermore, no definitive definition of a "large natural group" has ever been 
provided by the Crown. There is increasing concern that as a result of this policy smaller iwi, hapū 
and whānau will be prejudiced,36 either by their claims being subsumed into those of the larger 
grouping who do not effectively represent their interests, or by potentially missing out on the 
opportunity to have their claims settled with the Crown at all.37 Such prejudice will create further 
grievances which one day will also need to be confronted.38 Such a policy of the amalgamation of 
  
33  The commentary that does exist is largely of exemplary quality. See Māori Experiences of the Direct 
Negotiation Process, above n 31; Annie Mikaere "Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final, or Fatally 
Flawed?" (1997) 17 NZULR 425; Coxhead, above n 27; Shand, above n 8. 
34  See Red Book, above n 4, 44; Office of Treaty Settlements "Baseline Review of the Office of Treaty 
Settlements (OTS)" (20 November 2001) 12 (Obtained under the Official Information Act 1982 Request to 
the Director, Office of Treaty Settlements); Office of Treaty Settlements "Paper to Maori Affairs Committee 
Re: Speeding up of Historical Treaty Settlements" (8 October 2002) (Obtained under the Official 
Information Act 1982 Request to the Director, Office of Treaty Settlements).  
35  Malcolm Birdling "Healing the Past or Harming the Future? 'Large Natural Groupings' and the Treaty 
Settlement Process" (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2003) 12. 
36  Roughly translated, an iwi is a tribe, a hapū a subtribe, and whānau is a family unit. See generally Angela 
Ballara Iwi: The Dynamics of Māori Tribal Organisation From c. 1769 to c. 1945 (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1998). 
37  Birdling, above n 35, 20. 
38  Ibid. 
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claims is particularly concerning in light of the increasing academic commentary that states that it is 
hapū rather than iwi that form the basis of Māori society.39 Furthermore, many of these concerns 
have been acknowledged internally by OTS and other government departments, and yet the policy 
continues to be followed.40 
Second are mandate issues. The security of negotiating bodies' mandates has proven a 
significant ongoing issue for the Treaty settlement process. This is partly as a result of the large 
natural group policy forcing whānau and hapū into groups that are often far from "natural", and 
partly as a result of issues inherent in Māori tribal relations. From the early Tainui and Ngāi Tahu 
settlements, to the most recent Te Arawa Kaihautu Executive Council (KEC) settlement (Te Arawa 
settlement), mandate has proved a significant issue.41 The criticisms, as they relate to Crown action, 
largely centre on questions of whether the Crown has ensured that all groups the mandated body 
purports to represent have in fact given their support and authority to the body to settle their claims. 
Criticism of the manner in which the Crown has dealt with mandate issues has been particularly 
forceful in the Te Arawa settlement. There have now been three inquiries into the KEC's mandate, 
each increasingly critical of the Crown's approach and responses.42  
Possibly the most difficult aspect of the settlement process, and the most concerning area of 
Crown failure, is the process of dealing with those iwi who are not in negotiations with the Crown 
where their interests overlap with the interests of a settling group. Groups can suffer considerable 
prejudice as a result of the settlement of a neighbouring group's claims. Earlier settlements 
determine the availability of assets and resources to settle surrounding claims. Fluid and changing 
tribal histories combined with a non-exclusive understanding of cultural interests in land mean that 
in many areas of New Zealand multiple tribal groups have cultural interests in land and sites of 
significance.43 A settlement that fails to recognise a group's interests in a site may result in an 
  
39  Ballara, above n 36, 19. 
40  Office of Treaty Settlements "Completion of Historical Treaty Settlement Process: Strategic Overview" 
(February 2004) CBC (04) 23 (Obtained under the Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Director, 
Office of Treaty Settlements); Te Puni Kōkiri "Completion of Historical Treaty Settlement Process: 
Strategic Overview: Te Puni Kōkiri's Response" (3 February 2004) TP1115/4 (Obtained under the Official 
Information Act 1982 Request to the Director, Te Puni Kōkiri).  
41  Greensill and others v Tainui Maori Trust Board (17 May 1995) HC HAM M117/95; Waitaha Taiwhenua o 
Waitaki Trust v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu (17 June 1998) HC CHCH CP41/98; Waitangi Tribunal Te Arawa 
Mandate Report: Wai 1150 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2004) [Te Arawa Mandate Report]; Waitangi 
Tribunal Te Arawa Mandate Report: Te Wahanga Tuarua: Wai 1150 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2005) 
[Te Arawa Mandate Report: Te Wahanga Tuarua]; Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Impact of the Crown's 
Settlement Policy on the Te Arawa Waka: Wai 1353 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2007) [Te Arawa 
Waka]; Fenwick v Trustees of Nga Kaihautu o Te Arawa Executive Council (13 April 2006) HC ROT CIV 
2004-463-847. 
42  Footnote 41 above; Part IV C Subject-Matter of Claims; Te Arawa Waka, above n 41, 195 and 225. 
43  Ballara, above n 36. 
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unrepresented iwi, hapū or whānau losing access to culturally significant sites.  This has proven a 
considerable issue for the Crown, the extent of which was never foreseen. In 2007 alone, two 
extremely critical reports on the Crown's overlapping claims process were released.44 Each clearly 
illustrates the Crown's failure to understand the cultural implications of the settlement process on 
overlapping claimants and Māori society. The reports concluded the current process to be incapable 
of dealing with the individual circumstances before them:45 
Because of the connections between all of the people, and all of their connections to the land, dealing 
with all of the interests well is subtle and challenging work. It involves the Office of Treaty Settlements 
team forming relationships not only with those who are settling but also with those who for the time 
being are not. It is vital that this part of the settlement process is done well, but for the most part it seems 
to us that it is not being done at all. 
The Crown's process of dealing with overlapping claimants has developed in the last seven years 
as a response to various Tribunal reports. Yet as these recent reports illustrate, the steps taken have 
been insufficient to allay the fears of many Māori.46  
Of most concern to Māori, and more generally to those concerned with the effectiveness of New 
Zealand's political and legal accountability mechanisms, is the sense of déjà vu that is creeping into 
OTS failures and Treaty settlement process issues. Te Arawa is the most commanding example of 
this. With four Waitangi Tribunal reports into this one settlement the Tribunal was able to clearly 
discern a sustained attitude of disregard for Waitangi Tribunal recommendations which led to yet 
further issues for the Te Arawa settlement.47 In the Tamaki Makaurau Settlement Process Report 
(Tamaki Makaurau) the Tribunal reviewed all previous reports into the overlapping claims process 
and was greatly disappointed to discover that "[i]t appears that the approach of the Office of Treaty 
Settlements has not changed materially from those earlier cases to the present one."48  
IV WAITANGI TRIBUNAL AS A REVIEW MECHANISM 
Once it has been conceded that there are serious issues in the current Treaty settlement process it 
becomes necessary to decide in which fora these issues should be explored. Clearly there are the 
  
44  Te Arawa Waka, above n 41; Waitangi Tribunal The Tamaki Makaurau Settlement Process Report: Wai 
1362 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2007) [Tamaki Makaurau]. 
45  Tamaki Makaurau, ibid, 2. 
46  Ibid, 9. See Part V E Impact Analysis. See generally Māori Party "Maori Party says the Time has Come" (15 
June 2007) Press Release. 
47  Te Arawa Waka, above n 41, 33. 
48  Tamaki Makaurau, above n 44, 9. 
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judicial and political forums familiar to all countries; however New Zealand is relatively unique in 
having a well-established forum solely dedicated to hearing issues raised by its indigenous people.49 
Hendrik Hartog recognised the "problematic relationship between our social pluralism – the 
multiplicity of our social practices and normative identities – and the values we impute to legal 
order."50  Social pluralism, or the co-existence of multiple identifiable cultures, is an issue that 
extends past colonial nations. Combined with issues of indigeneity, however, it poses complex 
questions for society. Courts are ill-equipped to deal with cultures and belief systems alien to them. 
A resulting criticism of the courts providing remedies for indigenous peoples is that they are based 
in a legal system and set of practices that are inherently foreign to those indigenous people. Forcing 
indigenous peoples to fit their claims and grievances within the context of the dominant power's 
legal system and law is to perpetuate the process of colonisation:51 
For [indigenous peoples] the law has acted as a vehicle of totalization, colluding with a power that 
demanded constraint, delimitation, definition, demarcation. Aboriginal rights have become an elaborate 
juridical doctrine that legitimates these processes 
The Waitangi Tribunal is one unique example of an attempt to deal with the issues of social 
pluralism, and to create an arena in which culturally-specific claims may be heard. The influence of 
informed and culturally sensitive chairpersons, such as Judge Durie and the current Chairperson 
Judge Williams, has created a forum which is explicitly self-aware and overtly conscious of the 
need to make itself relevant to those seeking a voice within it.52  
A Nature of the Waitangi Tribunal  
The nature of the Tribunal continues to be a matter of some debate, but it is generally 
acknowledged to be equal to a permanent Commission of Inquiry which falls within a relatively 
flexible para-legal process.53 As a Commission of Inquiry the Waitangi Tribunal has the ability to 
  
49  There are forums in other countries dedicated to particular aspects of the process of hearing and settling 
indigenous claims. Some of these forums are called "tribunals". However, none of these equate to the 
Waitangi Tribunal in purpose, function or jurisdiction. Most are largely administrative and do not take part 
in the substantive investigation and determination of claims. Some Pacific island nations are currently at 
various stages of implementing bodies modelled on the Waitangi Tribunal.  
50  Hendrik Hartog "Pigs and Positivism" [1985] Wis L Rev 900, 902. 
51  Peter Kulchyski Unjust Relations: Aboriginal Rights in Canadian Courts (Oxford University Press, 
Toronto, 1994) 1. 
52  Richard Boast "Waitangi Tribunal Procedure" in Janine Hayward and Nicola R Wheen (eds) The Waitangi 
Tribunal: Te Roopu Whakamana i te Tiriti o Waitangi (Bridget William Books, Wellington, 2004) 
["Waitangi Tribunal Procedure"].  
53  E T J Durie "The Waitangi Tribunal: Its Relationship with the Judicial system" [1986] NZLJ 235, 235; 
"Waitangi Tribunal Procedure", ibid; R P Boast "Lawyers, Historians, Ethics and the Judicial Process" 
(1998) 28 VUWLR 87. 
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adopt more flexible procedures which are more relevant to the sensitive and diverse matters which it 
is asked to inquire into.54  
The Waitangi Tribunal is constituted under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. Section 5 of the 
Act provides that the Tribunal is to inquire into and make recommendations on claims, having 
regard to, and with the authority to interpret, the two texts of the Treaty of Waitangi. Claims may be 
made by any Māori person and can be about a broad range of things from ordinances and Acts of 
Parliament, through to any act or omission by the Crown.55 As a result of the broad definition of its 
jurisdiction, the Tribunal is able to inquire into a much wider range of issues than the courts. 
Following from the well known case law surrounding the move in the 1980s towards 
privatisation of government assets, the Treaty of Waitangi Act was amended in 1988. 56  The 
Waitangi Tribunal now had the power to make binding recommendations in respect of state-owned 
assets, forestry and some railways land.57   
B Contemporary Inquires  
Some surprise has been expressed at the recent upsurge in the Tribunal's contemporary 
jurisdiction. Despite the predominance of historical inquiries, the Waitangi Tribunal was originally 
set up to deal with contemporary claims.58 Therefore criticisms that the Tribunal is unreasonably 
stretching the boundaries of its designated purpose to deal with contemporary claims are 
misconceived. Contemporary inquiries are of increasing importance: with the inevitable conclusion 
of the Tribunal's historical function it seems unavoidable that contemporary inquiries will 
increasingly define the Tribunal's purpose and functions.59 Furthermore, the relationship between 
the processes of Waitangi Tribunal investigation and that of negotiation and settlement of claims is 
  
54  Durie and Orr, above n 16, 65. 
55  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6. "Māori" is defined in section 2 as "a person of the Māori race of New 
Zealand; and includes any descendant of such a person." The main things the Tribunal may not inquire into 
are bills currently before Parliament. 
56  Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988. 
57  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss 8A-8HJ. 
58  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6(6) (original 1975 text); "Influence on the Waitangi Tribunal", above n 13, 
2; "What is the Job of the Waitangi Tribunal?", above n 20, 3. 
59  Some of the contemporary claims coming before the Waitangi Tribunal are incredibly comprehensive and 
complex, and in many cases their broad reach or controversial subject-matter leads to them being 
particularly high-profile. Most notable are the Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy and the 
complex and comprehensive Wai 262 or Flora and Fauna inquiry which completed hearings in June 2007.  
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much more contentious that it appears at first glance. The Waitangi Tribunal provides an ongoing 
incentive for the Crown to ensure the smooth and durable settlement of claims.60  
In recent years the Waitangi Tribunal has found itself overwhelmed with applications for 
urgency inquiries into various aspects of the Crown's settlement policy and practice. These inquiries 
have culminated in a number of reports, the most recent of these receiving considerable public and 
political attention.61 Two of the reports released in 2007 went as far as to recommend that the 
Crown halt the settlements with the relevant groups.62 
Acknowledging the overwhelming number of urgent claims being made, the Acting Chairperson 
of the Waitangi Tribunal convened a judicial conference on 22 November 2006 to discuss the 
possible co-ordination of the various inquiries.63 At the conference it became clear that there was 
strong support for a broad generic inquiry into the Crown's settlement policy.64 This was ultimately 
rejected by the Tribunal in favour of the continuation of more specific inquiries into particular 
settlements of concern.65 The Tribunal felt that many of the issues were region-specific and feared 
prejudice to individual claimants if their claims were heard within a broad inquiry.66 It is likely that 
they were also motivated by concerns of separation of powers and not overstepping the bounds of 
their jurisdiction. 
One advantage of the Waitangi Tribunal is its technical expertise and experience in Māori land 
claims. As the Tribunal itself points out, to examine the reasonableness of cultural redress decisions 
made by the Crown it is occasionally necessary to make an independent evaluation of the 
  
60  See discussion of the recently filed remedies application of Ngāti Tuwharetoa: Part V D Judicial Impact 
Analysis. 
61  Waitangi Tribunal Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report: Wai 759 and 142 (Legislation Direct, 
Wellington, 2000); Waitangi Tribunal Ngati Maniapoto/Ngati Tama Settlement Cross-Claims Report: Wai 
788 and 800 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2001); Waitangi Tribunal Ngāti Awa Settlement Cross-Claims 
Report: Wai 958 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002); Waitangi Tribunal Ngāti Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau 
Settlement Cross-Claims Report: Wai 996 (Legislation Direct, Wellington 2003) [Tuwharetoa Cross-Claims 
Report]; Te Arawa Mandate Report, above n 41; Te Arawa Mandate Report: Te Wahanga Tuarua, above n 
41; Tamaki Makaurau, above n 44; Te Arawa Waka, above n 41; Waitangi Tribunal Final Report on the 
Impact of the Crown's Treaty Settlement Policy on the Te Arawa Waka and Other Tribes: Wai 1353 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2007) [Te Arawa Waka Final Report]. 
62  Tamaki Makaurau, ibid; Te Arawa Waka Final Report, ibid. 
63  Memorandum of the Acting-Chairperson, Waitangi Tribunal (19 October 2006). 
64  Memorandum of Counsel on behalf of Ngati Hikairo, Tamahaki Incorporated Society, Uenuku Tuwharetoa 
and Ngati Rangitihi (21 November 2006). A great deal of further support was given by other claimants' 
counsel in oral submissions, however no transcript was kept therefore there is unfortunately no reference to 
direct readers to.  
65  Memorandum of the Acting-Chairperson, Waitangi Tribunal, above n 63.  
66  Ibid, 11. 
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substantive value of claimant's interests in a particular site.67 The experience Tribunal members 
cultivate in historical inquiries means that they are well-placed to deal with such issues and make 
such technical pronouncements. 
However, the Tribunal often seeks to avoid answering these technical and resource-intensive 
questions in the course of Treaty settlement inquiries.68 To do so would be impossible within the 
limitations of an urgency inquiry and would defeat the purpose of the Tribunal's carefully scheduled 
historical inquiry process. As a result of the reluctance to investigate substantive issues of 
entitlement, Treaty settlement inquiries often closely resemble judicial review proceedings. The 
reports show a high level of scrutiny of Crown decision-making processes. Often this analysis is 
framed in terms such as reasonableness, good faith, fairness, impartiality and natural justice.69 In 
each case the assertions made by claimants are largely centred on the failure of the Crown to follow 
appropriate procedure.70 Other assertions rest on claims that the Crown had acted unreasonably and 
without good faith.71 
What distinguishes the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi from these broader legal ones are 
their foundation. Modern interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi is centred on the unique "living 
relationship" between the New Zealand Crown and Māori.72 Consequently, the expectations that 
rest on the Crown and Māori derive from concepts of partnership and equality, rather than looking 
to general administrative ideals or fundamental human rights. Outcomes are to be reached through a 
good faith process of engagement and collaboration. It is the lack of this sense of partnership in the 
Treaty settlement process that raises the most serious concerns:73 
We were dismayed, in Tamaki Makaurau, to see how little sign there was of any of these questions 
being resolved with any sense of partnership. The tone and style of the Crown's interaction was 
uniformly that of the decision-maker: the Crown holds all the cards, and pack is mostly hidden, and then 
the Crown tells everyone how the hand will be played. 
  
67  Te Arawa Waka, above n 41, 48. 
68  See generally ibid, 12. 
69  In the recent Te Arawa inquiry the Crown took this as far as to plead that the Tribunal's power to investigate 
was limited to matters of procedure and policy, and it was unable to inquire into the quality of substantive 
decisions: Closing Submissions on Behalf of the Crown (3 April 2007) Wai 1353, Doc # 3.3.32, para 4 
["Crown Submissions"].  
70  "Amended Submissions of Counsel for Ngāti Rangitihi" (Wai 996) (23 March 2007) Wai 1353, Doc # 
3.3.24 ["Submissions for Ngāti Rangitihi"]. 
71  Ibid, para 6; "Statement of Issues" (15 January 2007) Wai 1353, Doc # 2.5.28, Issue 2.2. 
72  Te Arawa Waka, above n 41, 34. 
73  Tamaki Makaurau, above n 44, 56. 
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It is this that makes the obligations owed to a Treaty partner higher than those owed to other 
stakeholders – further distinguishing the Treaty of Waitangi from the principles of good 
administration. Because the focus is a living relationship, the ideal is that the Treaty's rights and 
corresponding obligations can be more "flexible, practical, and natural".74  
C Subject Matter of Claims 
As a process-based area of review, the Treaty settlement inquiries within the Waitangi Tribunal 
fit much more closely into the traditional conception of administrative law than conventional 
Tribunal inquiries do. Rather than looking into the substantive nature of Crown actions, these 
inquiries often focus on investigation of the processes followed by the Crown within individual 
settlement negotiations.  
The recent Report of the Impact of the Crown's Settlement Policy on the Te Arawa Waka (Te 
Arawa Waka) and Final Report of the Impact of the Crown's Treaty Settlement Policy on the Te 
Arawa Waka and Other Tribes (Te Arawa Waka Final Report) examined the Crown's actions in 
negotiating the Te Arawa settlement. This agreement was negotiated with the KEC and is the largest 
settlement since Ngāi Tahu.75 The release of these two reports means that there are now a total of 
four reports by the Waitangi Tribunal into aspects of this particular settlement. Furthermore, there 
has been High Court action over the KEC's mandate,76 and the forestry aspects of the inquiry have 
been the subject of (thus far unsuccessful) litigation in the High Court and Court of Appeal.77 
The inquiry focused broadly on the following areas: overlapping claims, mandate, geothermal 
redress, and the forestry redress policy. The former three relate directly to the broader discussion of 
the areas of concern with the Treaty settlement process above.78 The issues raised about the forestry 
redress, while falling broadly into the category of overlapping claim concerns, are unique issues 
resulting from the agreement negotiated after the New Zealand Māori Council and Federation of 
Māori Authorities' challenge to the Crown's devolution of Crown assets in the late 1980s.79 The 
  
74  Ibid, 34; Lands case, above n 9, 642 Cooke P. 
75  Te Arawa Waka, above n 41; Te Arawa Waka Final Report, above n 61; "Crown Submissions", above n 69, 
para 10.2. 
76  Fenwick v Trustees of Ngā Kaihautu o Te Arawa Executive Council, above n 41. 
77  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (4 May 2007) HC WN CIV-2007-485-95; New Zealand 
Maori Council v Attorney-General [2007] NZCA 269. As at writing the claimants had sought leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court: "Notice of Application by First and Second Appellants for Leave to Bring 
Civil Appeal" to the Supreme Court of New Zealand (30 July 2007) in the case of New Zealand Māori 
Council v Attorney-General.  
78  See Part III C Issues with the Process. 
79  Lands case, above n 9; New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 142 (CA). See 
generally Janet McLean "New Public Management New Zealand Style" in Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins 
The Executive and the Public Law: Power and Accountability in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
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focus of the forestry redress claim was that if the Crown was to take the accumulated rentals held 
for successful claimants by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust (CFRT) for itself, it would be 
breaching an agreement negotiated in trust and good faith. In doing so the Crown would directly 
profit from a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi. A further criticism was that the process would 
potentially prejudice other claimants as it would lead to an increased amount of land being granted 
to settling groups, resulting in less forestry land available for iwi entering negotiations later on.80 
In its separate report into the forestry issues, the Waitangi Tribunal held:81 
We have no objection in principle to any mechanism which allows the Crown to offer a more generous 
settlement to claimants, provided always that the interests of groups outside the negotiations are 
protected. We would add that at the point that deferred selection over CFL lands was included in the 
offer to the KEC, the Crown must have known that the area of land which the KEC would be able to 
acquire would more than double, given the value of the accumulated rentals. Thus, the duty of the 
Crown to actively protect the interests of all groups with overlapping interests was increased, 
particularly as every hectare of CFL land in the pool was subject to overlapping claims. The highest 
standard of consultation with overlapping groups would be required, to communicate the complexity of 
the deal on offer, and to allow the groups to ensure that their interests were not prejudiced in the process. 
The Tribunal also held that the Crown's actions were insufficient to meet its burden of active 
protection:82 
In our view, for the Crown to include this provision in the deed of settlement is inconsistent with the 
Treaty. To make matters worse, the Crown failed to communicate this proposal to the other parties to 
that agreement (the NZMC and the FOMA), to the CFRT itself, to the claimant groups who might 
otherwise have received benefits from those rentals, and indeed to the general public. 
The situation created by the Crown's proposed actions in breach of the 1989 agreement is unique 
and illustrates the complexity of the issues that the Treaty settlement process raises. Any non-
political body faced with such questions is put in the rather dire position of having to examine the 
Crown's actions in what ultimately becomes part of the political and legislative process. All 
settlements are implemented through legislation, and therefore even where the Crown proposes 
  
University Press, Oxford, 2005) 125-160 ["New Public Management New Zealand Style"]; Palmer and 
Palmer, above n 4, 109-117; Matthew Palmer "The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986: Accountability?" 
(1988) 18 VUWLR 169; Nicola White "NZ Maori Council & Latimer v Attorney-General & Others" (1988) 
6 AULR 119; R P Boast "New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General: The Case of the Century?" 
[1987] NZLJ 240. 
80  Ngāti Rangitihi "Closing Submissions Regarding Commercial Redress for Ngati Rangitihi" (4 July 2007) 
Wai 1353, Doc # 3.3.63. 
81  Te Arawa Waka Final Report, above n 61, 39. 
82  Ibid, 42. 
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action that would breach an agreement affirmed in previous legislation, parliamentary sovereignty 
provides the shield behind which the Crown may hide. Nonetheless, when faced with such a 
proposition, surely the Crown's decision to take action breached a previous good faith agreement 
should be reviewable, and the rights of the negotiating partner protected. The forestry concerns 
raised by the Te Arawa settlement are an emotive example of the issues that claimants are seeking 
review of in this area.  
Forestry claims also brought life to another aspect of the Tribunal's jurisdiction: the power to 
make binding recommendations. This power was largely a dormant force, having only been used 
once prior.83 Suddenly the Central North Island (CNI) Tribunal (Wai 1200) found itself inundated 
with applications for binding recommendations over the forests within the CNI inquiry district. In 
response, the Chairperson Judge Wainwright directed counsel to provide submissions on the content 
of the Tribunal's jurisdiction in this area. Such was the degree of the unknown inherent in the 
territory being entered. A list of extensive criteria was established for the Waitangi Tribunal by 
which to process remedies applications. But despite this, all remedies applications were adjourned 
sine die as a result of the success of the CNI Collective process, discussed in more detail below. 
D Judicial Impact Analysis   
A Tribunal with a unique and culturally relevant voice means little if that voice is not heard and 
heeded. In order to establish whether this is occurring, it is first necessary to establish the 
framework in which Crown responses are to be reviewed  
A recent branch of judicial review study has emerged and become known as the "judicial 
impact" line of administrative study.84 This examines the impact of administrative decisions both 
within the political science sphere of social and political change, and within the socio-legal sphere 
of the strength of the law to control governmental power.85 A beneficial analysis of the Tribunal 
and courts' work can be produced using the judicial impact framework. 
 
Waitangi Tribunal investigation into the Treaty settlement process is a relatively new 
development, with the first report being released in 2000. Although important contemporary claims 
have been heard throughout the Tribunal's history, recent reports such as The Petroleum Report, 
Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy and the Wai 262 or Flora and Fauna claim 
have been highly contentious and received a new level of political scrutiny. That is not to say that 
 
83  Waitangi Tribunal The Turangi Township Remedies Report: Wai 84 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 1995). 
84  Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday "Introduction" in Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday (eds) Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004) 1-2. Also see Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings Administrative Law (2 ed, 
Butterworths, London, 1997) 565-73; R Rawlings "Judicial Review and the "Control of Government"" 
(1986) 64 Pub Adm 125. 
85  Hertogh and Halliday, ibid, 2. 
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI SETTLEMENT PROCESS 241 
past reports have not been high-profile or contentious, as clearly claims such as Radio Spectrum, Te 
Reo and Muriwhenua Fisheries were extremely high profile. Rather, the more recent reports have 
been the high-profile claims of a new political era, and therefore have faced challenges different 
from those of their predecessors. Within the Treaty settlement context it is only very recently that 
the trends or patterns resulting from this new political era have become apparent.  
It is essential that the objectives and purpose of review be understood at the outset. This requires 
a decision to be made about whether administrative review is aimed at outcomes for the individual 
applicant, or whether it attempts to address systematic bureaucratic failure. 86  Protection of 
irreplaceable cultural interests is fundamental and its importance should never be understated. 
However, the bigger issue is repeated systematic failure within bureaucratic decision-making. The 
Waitangi Tribunal can only have a lasting effect and prevent future prejudice to Māori by 
remedying these larger, recurring failures. It is therefore within this framework that the Crown's 
response will be reviewed. 
Any discussion of review in the Waitangi Tribunal is inevitably influenced by the jurisdictional 
and formal limitations on the Tribunal's powers. Except in very limited circumstances, its powers 
are solely recommendatory.87 Recommendations can be general or specific,88 and reports will often 
include a mixture of both: incorporating general principles alongside specific recommendations to 
be implemented.89 As a result of the non-binding character of its recommendations, the impact of 
Tribunal decisions rests largely on the credibility and political weight of the reports. 
  
86  Peter Cane "Understanding Judicial Review and Its Impact" in Hertogh and Halliday, above n 84, 15, 32. 
87  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 5 and 6. A historically less utilised incentive is the Waitangi Tribunal's 
power to hold a remedies hearing from which it can make binding recommendations in respect of existing 
and former state owned enterprises land and forests. Such a recommendation has been made only once, and 
the response from the government was swift, negotiating an alternative settlement to ensure only minimal 
lands were ultimately "clawed back" from private ownership. However, as a result of increasing 
dissatisfaction with the negotiation and settlement process, increasing pressure is being placed on the 
Tribunal to convene remedies hearings and utilise this power. The "risk" of the Tribunal convening such a 
hearing has been acknowledged internally by OTS: Office of Treaty Settlements "Baseline Review of the 
Office of Treaty Settlements (OTS)" (20 November 2001) 6 (Obtained under the Official Information Act 
1982 Request to the Director, Office of Treaty Settlements). However, this paper will not look at the 
binding recommendatory power in any great deal as it falls outside of the scope of the discussion at hand. 
88  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6(4). 
89  There has been a change in the nature of Tribunal reporting, most likely as a result of the increased 
dominance of the Treaty settlement process. Earlier reports were more likely to make specific 
recommendations, whereas more recently the Tribunal has stopped after making findings of breach and 
more general recommendations, leaving details of redress to be negotiated between the Crown and the 
particular claimants. 
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Harlow and Rawlings argue that the overriding function of "public law is the control of abuse of 
power".90 This is particularly true within the context of Waitangi Tribunal review. Its focus on the 
protection of the inherent rights of an indigenous minority means there is a considerable power 
imbalance in favour of the Crown. Much litigation and many Tribunal inquiries in the past have 
been centred on attempts to stop Crown actions that would breach Treaty guarantees. This was 
particularly true during the 1980s when the state was rapidly changing. Māori feared that the 
devolution of control over state enterprises would result in the loss of significant rights and 
resources. 91  However, recent Waitangi Tribunal inquiries have become centred on a more 
facilitative role that better fits within the "green light theory" proposed by Harlow and Rawlings.92 
The aim of these inquiries is to "facilitate legitimate government action".93  The issue with the 
settlement process is that its unilateral development has created a process that has an inherent lack 
of transparency. It is inflexible, and at times extremely difficult to navigate.94 Therefore, ironically, 
adversarial litigation in the Tribunal has become the last resort for Māori seeking more meaningful 
engagement and dialogue with the Crown in the settlement process.  
The non-binding nature of its recommendations means that in order to be effective the Tribunal 
is forced to work within a green light framework. The Tribunal and the Crown must actively engage 
and work towards constructive solutions. It is essential that both parties are committed to the 
process and recognise the importance and credibility of the other. In some areas simply the process 
of airing grievances can achieve these goals, as Crown officials are given the opportunity to hear 
and understand the grievances of Māori.95 However, this is only successful where officials are 
already open and responsive to such concerns. In reality, to portray the Waitangi Tribunal as a 
separate and autonomous branch of review is misleading. The Waitangi Tribunal's effectiveness 
  
90  Harlow and Rawlings, above n 84, 25. See also Louis L Jaffe and Edith G Henderson "Judicial Review and 
the Rule of Law: Historical Origins" (1956) 72 LQR 345, 346. But see Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins 
"Introduction" in Craig and Tomkins, above n 79, 8-14. Contrast H W R Wade and C F Forsyth 
Administrative Law (8 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 4-5; P P Craig Administrative Law 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) ch 1. 
91  In particular the various New Zealand Māori Council cases dealing with the State Owned Enterprises 
legislation and policies; see Part IV C Subject-Matter of the Claims. 
92  See Harlow and Rawlings, above n 84, 67-90. 
93  Ibid, 71. 
94  Coxhead, above n 27, 24 and 26-27; Māori Experiences of the Direct Negotiations Process, above n 31, 60.   
95  An example of this is the response of Karen Sewell of the Minister of Education to the issues raised in the 
Wai 262 hearings, and in public submissions, to the omission of any references to the Treaty of Waitangi in 
the recently released Draft National Curriculum: Transcript of Cross-Examination of Karen Sewell, 
Ministry of Education (26 January 2007) Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 262, 369; Māori Party "Māori Party 
Celebrates Treaty Restored to Education" (14 March 2007) Press Release www.scoop.co.nz (accessed 27 
September 2007). 
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rests on the efficacy of the political process. The achievement of real outcomes depends almost 
entirely on the existence of a political will to implement Tribunal recommendations. If the Tribunal 
is seen as out of touch with reality, its recommendations can easily be swept aside with little 
political consequence.  
In some areas Tribunal recommendations appeared to have led to fundamental changes in 
Crown policy. As a result of recommendations in the Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau Cross-Claims Report 
OTS began to consult with cross-claimants once the Terms of Negotiation were completed rather 
than waiting until the Agreement in Principle has been finalised. 96  However, as subsequent 
inquiries have shown, a change in policy does not necessarily equate to a change in practice, leading 
to concerns about the value of such responses. 
 
Many of the Tribunal's recommendations are implemented at the most basic of levels and in a 
manner that demonstrates minimal engagement by the Crown. The Te Arawa Mandate Report 
recommended the Crown reconfirm the mandate of the KEC.97 This was done by OTS as requested. 
However, it was done within very specific boundaries and led to no broader policy analysis. Further 
recommendations of the Tribunal regarding individual claimants were explicitly rejected by Crown 
officials who stated that the recommendations were given with "little analysis" and "did not respond 
to the Crown's evidence".98  As a result, the claimants were back in the Tribunal within a few 
months of the release of the report.99  
It became apparent in the most recent Te Arawa inquiry that OTS had failed to advise the 
Minister on all recommendations made by the Tribunal in its 2005 Te Arawa Mandate Report: Te 
Wahanga Tuarua. This has since been conceded by Crown officials to be a serious mistake.100  
Such actions illustrate a disregard for the value of Tribunal recommendations within administrative 
decision-making. Rather than facilitating positive developments in government action, bureaucratic 
disregard for the decisions has undermined the potential value of the inquiry process. A lack of 
adequate internal reporting processes disables any potential consideration or dialogue before it could 
begin. This illustrates the failure of the Waitangi Tribunal process to meet the expectations of the 
"green light theory".  
 
96  Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau Cross-Claims Report, above n 61; Briefing Paper to the Minister in Charge of 
Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations from the Office of Treaty Settlements (14 August 2003) 48/NE18 062 00 
02, para 22 (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to Director, Office of Treaty 
Settlements). 
97  Te Arawa Mandate Report, above n 41, 113. 
98  Briefing Paper to the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations from the Office of Treaty 
Settlements (12 August 2004) 39/CLA-TR-01-081-02, para 32 (Obtained under Official Information Act 
1982 Request to Director, Office of Treaty Settlements). 
99  Te Arawa Mandate Report: Te Wahanga Tuarua, above n 61. 
100  "Crown Submissions", above n 69, para 18. 
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Disregard for Tribunal recommendations is shown throughout the briefing papers provided to 
the Minister. Comments from officials repeatedly reinforce the tense nature of the relationship 
between the Tribunal and OTS. In one briefing to the Minister, OTS officials stated:101 
In our view, the Tribunal has set the bar too high in terms of its perception of the Crown's obligations to 
cross-claimants and the steps that the Crown should take to meet those obligations. Its observations 
seem to be symptomatic of a limited understanding of the work and time that is required for 
negotiations, the difficulties of engaging with cross-claimants, and the pragmatic balancing exercise that 
is required between the interests of the settling group and those of cross-claimants. 
In relation to one recommendation, OTS officials expressed serious concerns about issues of 
practicality:102 
The Tribunal's suggestion for according priority status to Ngāti Makino, Waitaha, and Tapuika and a 
cluster around Ngāti Whakaue raises a number of significant implications in respect of Crown strategy, 
policy and resourcing…. 
However, not all Tribunal recommendations have received such outright rejection from officials. 
There are examples of more constructive engagement with recommendations that officials saw as 
problematic:103 
The Crown generally avoids making judgements as to which groups are tangata whenua. We would be 
reluctant to notify territorial authorities that Ngāti Rangitihi are tangata whenua at Matata. We consider 
it reasonable to notify territorial authorities that Ngāti Rangitihi people live at Matata, and that provision 
has been made for Ngāti Rangitihi … to receive cultural redress of the same or similar kind to Ngāti 
Awa and Ngāti Tuwharetoa as part of a Treaty settlement. 
Nonetheless, despite such examples of constructive engagement, more often OTS responses 
illustrate that although OTS strives to create a perception of acquiescence to Waitangi Tribunal 
decisions, Crown officials far from see themselves as bound by the recommendations made. They 
question whether Tribunal members have the necessary capabilities and understanding.104 Broadly 
  
101  Briefing Paper to the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations (30 March 2005) 296/CLA-TR-
01-081-02, para 14 (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to Director, Office of Treaty 
Settlements) Annex A, para 21. 
102  Ibid, para 14. 
103  Ibid, para 14.   
104  Potentially, as the volume of urgency inquiries continues to increase, individual Tribunal members and 
judges beginning to specialise in these types of inquiries may continue to increase the quality and credibility 
of Tribunal reports in this area. 
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speaking the Crown has attempted to acknowledge and implement the recommendations. But on 
closer analysis their responses often fall more accurately into the category of non-acquiescence.105    
Such precedents create an interesting background when considering how the Crown has 
responded and will respond to the recent highly critical Te Arawa Waka and Tamaki Makaurau 
reports. The Crown's actions in this area have been drawn directly into the public eye by these 
reports. 106 With this much public attention, meaningless surface conformity is no longer possible. 
After the release of the Te Arawa Waka Final Report on 30 July 2007 there existed a great deal of 
uncertainty as to how the government would respond.107 In the past publicity has not stopped the 
Crown from ignoring Tribunal recommendations and pursuing its desired policy. Examples of such 
conduct can be seen in Crown rejection of both the Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed 
Policy and The Petroleum Report. This sets a concerning precedent and illustrates a dramatic 
decline in the political impact of the Tribunal.  
Tribunal recommendations are limited, not because of their recommendatory nature, but rather 
because of the issues inherent in judicial investigation of executive functions. Officials do not see 
themselves as bound by recommendations when they feel that these recommendations evidence a 
lack of understanding of executive constraints. In order for the Tribunal's recommendations to be of 
greater force the public engagement that was historically important in the Tribunal process needs to 
be reinvigorated.108 If Tribunal recommendations are given more public credibility then there will 
be greater pressure on officials to further engage with recommendations that they see as practically 
difficult to implement, because the decisions will carry more political capital. Recent public interest 
in the Treaty settlement process and the subsequent government response is an indication that this 
revitalisation has begun. Whether it will result in the considerable changes necessary to effectively 
protect Māori interests is yet to be seen.  
E  CNI Collective and the Forests 
In response to the Te Arawa Waka Final Report the Government announced that it would delay 
the introduction of the Te Arawa settlement legislation until the Crown had met with concerned 
  
105  See the three ways government agencies can respond to judicial decisions: Bradley C Canon "Studying 
Bureaucratic Implementation of Judicial Policies in the United States: Conceptual and Methodological 
Approaches" in Hertogh and Halliday, above n 84, 79-95.  
106  See Yvonne Tahana "Tribunal Wants Tribes to Sort out Forestry Settlement" (2 August 2007) New Zealand 
Herald www.nzherald.co.nz (accessed 26 August 2007).  
107  "Government Pushes on with Treaty Deal Over Forests" (17 August 2007) New Zealand Herald 
www.nzherald.co.nz (accessed 25 August 2007). 
108  Regarding the decline in the public element of Tribunal inquiries see R P Boast "The Waitangi Tribunal and 
Transitional Justice" (VUW Cross-Campus Symposium, Contemporary Human Rights in Perspective, 
Wellington, 23 August 2006) 7. 
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Central North Island iwi and discussed their concerns.109 When discussing the reasons for the delay, 
Rt Hon Dr Michael Cullen stated:110 
It has never been the Crown's intention to become the ultimate beneficiary of these funds and we have 
stated that the funds would be used for Maori development. I am leading work considering how this can 
be best achieved.  
It was agreed "that providing other iwi in the region with the opportunity to discuss their 
concerns with the Crown will ultimately benefit all in the region."111 However, at the same time the 
Crown reiterated its "commitment to honour the Crown settlement offer".112  
This response was received with a degree of scepticism. The Waitangi Tribunal had boldly said 
that it "cannot endorse the KEC settlement in its current form" and it recommended "that the 
proposed settlement be varied and delayed pending the outcome of a forum of CNI iwi convened by 
Te Puni Kōkiri."113 The Crown's response clearly showed that it was unwilling to vary the Te 
Arawa settlement. While it was engaging in a form of dialogue with the CNI claimants, many felt 
that the worth of this engagement was likely to be limited while the Crown refuses to compromise 
on the foundational issue – the inclusion of the deferred selection of forestry assets in the Te Arawa 
settlement. Was the Crown creating simply yet another forum for affected iwi to voice their 
concerns, rather than a place in which a constructive solution could be forged? 
The overwhelming lack of faith in the Crown's promise was evidenced in the surge of urgent 
remedies applications filed with the Waitangi Tribunal asking it to use its power to make binding 
recommendations over forestry assets.114 The applications state that the matter has become one of 
urgency as a result of the imminent implementation of Te Arawa settlement from which they will 
suffer prejudice.115 This is a clear rejection of the Crown's offer of dialogue and indicates an acute 
lack of faith in the Crown's engagement with the concerns of overlapping claimants in this area.  
  
109  Hon Mark Burton "Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi and Hapu Settlement Legislation" (24 August 2007) Press 
Release. 
110  Ibid. 
111  Ibid. 
112  Ibid. 
113  Te Arawa Waka Final Report, above n 61, 68. 
114  Ngā Hapū o Ngāti Tuwharetoa "Application for Resumption of Licensed Land Pursuant to s 8HB of the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975" (18 September 2007) Wai 1200 ["Application for Resumption"]; Ngā Hapū o 
Ngāti Tuwharetoa "Memorandum of Counsel in Support of Application for Resumption" (18 September 
2007) Wai 1200. 
115  "Application for Resumption", ibid, 2. 
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The motivational relevance of these applications to the Crown is unclear, but there is no doubt 
that they were a relevant concern. It cannot be doubted that the Crown had a strong interest in 
avoiding the use of the Waitangi Tribunal's binding powers. 
Slowly but surely a number of key successes have swayed many iwi who initially refused to 
participate. The Collective and the Crown signed a Terms of Agreement setting out the terms of the 
ongoing relationship.116 Since then the Collective has presented to the Crown a proposal outlining 
the method by which the CNI forests shall be divided amongst the various claimants. 117  The 
agreement has gained a high degree of support from the Maori involved. Groups that had previously 
remained outside the CNI Collective, such as Ngati Raukawa and Ngati Manawa, joined and began 
working for a dialogue-based solution. 
As the most important outcomes are those that relate to the development and improvement of 
bureaucratic processes,118 significant value could be obtained if the CNI Collective was able to 
develop a precedent that would prevent further breaches and allow for more effective processes in 
the future. Even where individual recommendations are not heeded, it is the Crown's response to the 
broader concerns about its policy and processes that is of fundamental importance. It appears that 
more heartening progress is being made than many initially believed likely. However, cynical as it 
may be, one cannot be too surprised by a sudden upsurge in political action during an election year. 
The recent transfer of the portfolio to Dr Michael Cullen has seen a major change in the handling of 
Treaty settlements. Dr Cullen has taken a much more hands-on leadership role, reminiscent of 
National's Doug Graham. What is concerning is that this is a pace that cannot be sustained. Dr 
Cullen's forceful approach may result in great benefits for some claimant groups, in the form of 
immediate and very generous settlements. The risk of such a single-minded focus is that the 
Waitangi Tribunal and the next government will be left with the aftermath of claimants who have 
suffered with no chance to have their voice heard in a much condensed overlapping claims process. 
Very little could be offered by a Waitangi Tribunal faced with a number of groups whose interests 
have been steamrolled over in pre-election haste. Further, once again this is a process that very 
much "picks winners", as the groups who will gain the government's attention prior to the election 
are those large cohesive groups with whom a settlement equates to generous political capital. The 
Collective defines itself as an "Iwi Collective", excluding smaller unrepresented hapu within the 
area. 
  
116  Terms of Agreement Between the Minister of Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations and Tumu Te 
Heuheu, Ngati Rangitihi, Ngai Tuhoe, Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Whakaue and Ngati Whare (22 February 
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117  Michael Cullen "Central North Island Proposal a Positive step" (4 April 2008) www.beehive.co.nz 
(accessed 27 April 2008); Central North Island Iwi Collective "Forest Land Settlement Proposal Presented" 
(5 April 2008) www.scoop.co.nz (accessed 27 April 2008). 
118  See Part IV E Judicial Impact Analysis. 
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V PLACE OF THE COURTS  
It is slightly strange to ask what the place of the courts is in the review of the Treaty settlement 
process, as the courts themselves have repeatedly declared that they do not have a place. 
Nonetheless, the negotiation and settlement process has been plagued with litigation and 
controversy ever since its inception in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The failure of the politics to 
provide any meaningful response, combined with the ineffectiveness of review in the Waitangi 
Tribunal causes claimants to persevere in their attempts to draw the courts into the Treaty settlement 
"battleground". Despite these attempts the courts have maintained a hard-line refusal to engage, and 
continue to invoke the assistance of non-justiciability in order to maintain their "Swedish 
neutrality".  
A Courts' Statements of Non-Justiciability  
The determinative case in establishing that the Treaty settlement process is non-justiciable was 
that of Milroy v Attorney-General (Milroy).119 There the Court of Appeal held:120 
But where the action challenged does not itself affect the rights of any persons and is undertaken in the 
course of policy formulation preparatory to the introduction to Parliament of legislation, the courts will 
not intervene. Proposed legislative conduct of the Crown said to depart from a previous stance and to be 
inconsistent with Treaty rights may be within the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal and may be the 
subject of representations to the Select Committees of Parliament. But, as Goddard J said, the courts 
cannot help.  
As this shows, the Court not only held that there was no relevant head of jurisdiction,121 it also 
made it clear that it considered all such challenges non-justiciable as they fell within the bounds of 
conduct preparatory to the introduction of legislation. Milroy built on the foundation established by 
Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General (Sealords), where the Court of Appeal 
originally pointed to the fact that "[t]here is an established principle of non-interference by the 
Courts in Parliamentary proceedings."122 
The courts' issue with the questions that claimants raise is the inherently political nature of much 
of the content. This can be seen from the early case of Greensill v Tainui Maori Trust Board 
(Greensill):123  
  
119  Milroy v Attorney-General [2005] NZAR 562 (CA). 
120  Ibid, para 18 Gault P for the Court. 
121  Ibid, para 10. 
122  Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA), para 15 Cooke P for 
the Court. See generally Peter Cane Administrative Law (4 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 47.  
123  Greensill v Tainui Maori Trust Board, above n 41, 12 Hammond J. 
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I do not see how it can be said that this is anything other than a political document. And on that basis 
this Court should be extremely cautious about intervening. I do not say that a Court could never 
intervene in a document having some political characteristics… But I am clear that the Court should not 
do so here. 
Ultimately this matter will have to be finally resolved where it should be resolved – in Parliament.  
Hammond J's arguments are on one level accurate: a settlement is an inherently political process 
involving many highly political and polycentric decisions. One cannot deny the complexity of the 
decisions that are made in this area. Direct interference by the court in such decisions would often 
equate to "interference in the political process", 124  and therefore would be contrary to the 
foundational constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The motive for defending such 
separation in the Treaty settlement context is best expressed by Goddard J in Pouwhare v Attorney-
General:125 
[The non-justiciability of this claim] is because the decision under challenge in each case is a policy 
decision, reached as the result of a negotiated settlement process which has received the imprimatur of 
Cabinet approval. Further, notwithstanding that Cabinet approval, the decision is still in the nature of a 
preliminary decision and subject to Parliamentary scrutiny before any necessary legislation 
implementing settlement [sic] can be enacted.  
However, while this justification may be correct in relation to certain elements of the claims 
being made, it does not justify the courts' refusal to intervene in all cases. To understand this it is 
necessary to look closer at the concept of non-justiciability. 
B Theory of Justiciability 
The most commonly cited New Zealand definition of non-justiciability comes from the case of 
Curtis v Minister of Defence (Curtis):126 
A non-justiciable issue is one in respect of which there is no satisfactory legal yardstick by which the 
issue can be resolved. That situation will often arise in cases into which it is also constitutionally 
inappropriate for the Courts to embark. 
Justiciability is a test of whether an issue is one that is properly suited to adjudication in the 
courts, or put more broadly, about "where public decision-making should best reside".127 It is a 
  
124  Watene v Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations (11 May 2001) HC WN CP 120/01, para 
33 Goddard J. 
125  Pouwhare v Attorney-General (30 August 2002) HC WN CP78/02, para 7 Goddard J 
126  Curtis v Minister of Defence [2002] 2 NZLR 744, para 27 (CA) Tipping J for the Court. 
127  B V Harris "Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of Mercy" (2003) 62 CLJ 631, 634. 
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screening device that allows for a "'big picture' constitutional appreciation of whether or not the 
decision is an appropriate one for the courts."128 
To ensure consistency, certainty and clarity, the factors relevant to an assessment of 
appropriateness within justiciability must be fleshed out.  Many feel uncomfortable with the concept 
that the courts are the judge of what matters they can and should adjudicate on, citing the maxim 
nemo judex in re sua (no man should be the judge of his own cause) as evidence of the 
undesirability of such an approach.129 Justiciability is a troublesome concept and a potential "forum 
for tension between judicial restraint and judicial activism."130 Therefore, in order to maintain the 
credibility of the courts' discretion, it is necessary that the test applied be as transparent as 
possible.131 
One of the earliest cases on justiciability is the English case of Council of Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service (CCSU).132 There it was not necessary for the House of Lords to 
expound in any great detail the factors relevant to non-justiciability, as the area under consideration 
– national security – was clearly outside the scope of the Court's jurisdiction.133 However, as more 
difficult cases have come before the courts, three broad factors to be considered have been 
espoused: the capacity and legitimacy of the judicial process, the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers, and nature of the issues being considered. 134  The factors have been 
articulated in other ways but this is one is the most practically useful.135 
 
The first of these factors, capacity, includes fundamental practical considerations such as the 
availability of resources and the suitability of the issues to determination through an adjudicative, 
adversarial process of dispute resolution.136 The quote from Curtis is directly relevant here:137 in 
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Chris Finn "The Justiciability of Administrative Decisions: A Redundant Concept?" (2002) 30 Fed L Rev 
239. 
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133  Ibid, 397 Diplock J. 
134  Lorne M Sossin Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada (Carswell, 
Scarborough, 1999) 2 [Boundaries of Judicial Review]. 
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136  See Lon Fuller "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv L Rev 353. 
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order to effectively deal with the case at hand the courts must have some appropriate legal yardstick 
against which to measure the claim. If the claim is wholly unsuited to determination through the 
adjudicative process, such a legal yardstick will often be absent. 
The question of legitimacy is broader and refers to the idea that within our constitutional 
structure the courts are not always the appropriate place to raise and resolve an issue: "the courts 
may not be the appropriate body, or be suitably equipped in all contexts to carry out the decision-
making which judicial review would ideally ask of them." 138  This combines practical 
considerations such as the experience and capacities of judges with constitutional factors such as the 
boundaries set by the principle of separation of powers, discussed below. It also requires a 
clarification of the role of the judiciary: is the judiciary a body concerned solely with simple dispute 
resolution between individual parties, or does it have a larger constitutional role in espousing and 
protecting public values?139 If the courts have a broader role in the protection of public values such 
as fundamental human rights and the protection of minorities then there is a much stronger 
obligation on them to hear claims that touch on elements of policy and political issues. Conversely, 
if their role is simply limited to that of dispute resolution between individual parties about issues 
that directly affect those particular parties and not others, then the courts should be more deferential 
when issues are of a polycentric or political nature. 140  The answer to this is found in one's 
understanding of the practical implications of separation of powers. 
 
Separation of powers is the well known basis of our constitutional system whereby each of the 
three branches of government has their own function and must not encroach on the functions of the 
other branches:141   
Parliament will set the framework of general rules for society, the executive will govern within those 
rules and an independent judiciary will resolve disputes over the meaning of those rules and will, in 
particular, keep the executive within the boundaries of the law.  
It flows from this that the courts have an obligation to check that the executive acts within its 
constitutional boundaries, including ensuring respect for inherent human and indigenous rights.142 
Nevertheless, it is essential that the judiciary respect the boundaries of its jurisdiction and not 
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encroach on that of the executive and, in particular, the democratically elected Parliament. This is 
especially relevant in light of the fact that the judiciary is not elected and therefore is not directly 
representative or accountable. Respect for boundaries must be balanced with an appreciation of the 
significant benefits the courts can offer as an independent accountability mechanism. 143  
Furthermore, many commentators who support the concept of legal constitutionalism point to the 
fact that the courts are in fact indirectly accountable to the people as a result of the need for 
sustained public confidence and credibility.144 
As well as answering the questions posed regarding legitimacy, separation of powers seeks to 
enforce boundaries based in the source of the power exercised by the decision-maker. Rather than 
looking at the nature of the issue as shall be discussed below, here the court is asked to look at the 
source of the power that is being reviewed and to question whether it would be contrary to our 
constitutional structure to use the courts to hold the particular decision-maker accountable.145 Over 
time the importance of the source of a decision-maker's power has gradually diminished, replaced 
by a focus on the nature of the issues.146 It is now generally accepted that in most cases it is the 
nature and content that determines a matter's justiciability, not its source.147 
The nature of the issue alludes to a number of variants. As a starting point it must be asked 
whether it is a monolithic dispute, or one that is inherently polycentric and therefore requires the 
weighing of many competing interests which affect large sectors of society.148 It must be realised 
"that certain kinds of human relations are not appropriate raw material for a process of decision that 
is institutionally committed to acting on the basis of reasoned argument."149 If the issue is between 
two individuals and is unlikely to have any consequences beyond those individuals before the court, 
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the court has little reason to refuse to hear the dispute.150 However if the decision is of a more 
polycentric nature, then any decision by the court will have far-reaching consequences, making the 
decision more like policy formation than adjudicative decision-making.151  This means that the 
dispute itself will be less suited to resolution by judicial inquiry.  
Another highly influential element is the political content of the issue. Where issues are highly 
political and internal to government the courts will rarely intervene because to do so would involve 
the courts treading into territory where they have limited experience and are not best situated to deal 
with the issues.152  
Despite the growing amount of case law and academic commentary on the topic of justiciability, 
one issue that has not been directly dealt with in much detail is the source of a dispute's non-
justiciability. 153  Questions have been raised about whether any dispute can be inherently non-
justiciable – particularly in highly political areas such as national security.154  But the question 
remains: when a dispute is non-justiciable is the court declaring that it simply does not have (and 
therefore never had) jurisdiction to hear the dispute, or, conversely is the court "for some reason 
[relinquishing] their ordinary constitutional function"?155 The Court in CCSU seemed to imply that 
the non-justiciability of the issues before them was something unavoidable and therefore something 
for which they could not be held accountable as decision-makers:156 
Once the factual basis is established by evidence so that the court is satisfied that the interest of national 
security is a relevant factor to be considered in the determination of the case, the court will accept the 
opinion of the Crown … unless it is possible to show that the opinion was one which no reasonable 
minister advising the Crown could in the circumstances have held. There is no abdication of the judicial 
function, but there is a common sense limitation recognised by the judges as to what is justiciable… 
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The importance of this issue lies in the potential limitations on the courts' obligations when 
declaring an issue non-justiciable. If questions are inherently non-justiciable then the court has no 
discretion in the matter. Certain matters are simply outside the realm of the courts' jurisdiction and 
they simply cannot ever deal with those issues. An example of this approach is the "excluded 
categories" referred to by Lord Roskill in CCSU.157 Conversely, if the courts refuse to hear an issue 
simply because they feel it would be better dealt with in an alternative forum, then the courts have 
exercised discretion and this requires justification.158  
The way in which the courts are increasingly intertwining questions of justiciability with the 
concept of judicial deference implies that the source of non-justiciability is the latter.159 Simply put, 
the courts defer to the political branches of government in recognition of their superior expertise and 
ability in relation to a particular dispute.160 In doing this the court is giving up its inherent power of 
review. It is reasonable to infer that when choosing to defer to the political branches the court 
should provide reasons for abdicating its role:161 
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the 
constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever 
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right 
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or 
the other would be treason to the constitution [sic]. 
The serious consequences of justiciability decisions make it reasonable to expect the courts to 
justify their decision. Furthermore, it is appropriate to also expect that the courts will ensure that the 
alternative forum they have deferred to will in fact provide justice to the individual or individuals 
concerned. It would go against the principle of access to justice if the court could simply defer to the 
political branch of government when it is clear that the parties' voices will not be heard in that 
forum. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the courts have held that "[even] when a court 
is faced with the exercise of a discretionary power, inquiry is not altogether excluded: the court will 
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intervene to correct excess of abuse."162  The importance of the availability of other means of 
recourse is something that the courts are well aware of and clearly take into account. As for example 
in Milroy:163 
Proposed legislative conduct of the Crown said to depart from a previous stance and to be inconsistent 
with Treaty rights may be within the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal and may be the subject of 
representations to the Select Committee of Parliament. 
The practical availability of these alternative forums is often taken for granted. The availability 
of alternative forums is particularly problematic where the issues at question involve the protection 
of human and minority rights. The concern is that to leave the protection of such rights to a 
democratically elected government opens the possibility for a "tyranny of the majority". 
C Analysis  
The courts continue to hold that review of the process of Treaty settlements is simply beyond 
the bounds of their jurisdiction.164 The development of the Crown's settlement agreement with a 
particular iwi is an important and highly contentious area of policy formation. It has considerable 
fiscal implications as well as impacting heavily on a large number of Crown agencies and public 
interests.165 It is desirable that such decisions remain for the Crown to determine, in order that those 
with the most experience can consider all of the complex and interconnected issues. This allows 
Crown officials to assess all the relevant information, listen to a wider range of stakeholders, and 
engage in a focused and well-resourced process of policy development to facilitate the most 
informed and balanced outcomes possible.166  
The issue with the courts' approach is that a lack of detailed analysis of claims brought before it 
has resulted in the failure of the court to recognise that many of the claims deal with issues 
peripheral to the inherently political issues of Treaty settlement policy. Hammond J in Greensill 
held that "in cases of this kind … [the court] must stand, not under a portable palm tree, but an 
umbrella of articulated principle".167 It is clear from this that the courts appreciate the need for 
focused analysis in this area. Rather than constantly erring on the side of caution, the courts should 
hold at the forefront of their mind the fact that "judicial abnegation of responsibility … seems quite 
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inconsistent with the theory of the Rule of Law, which insists that, at least within the realm, all 
aspects of government are conducted within the law."168 The courts' outright rejection of Treaty 
settlement cases as non-justiciable without principled analysis has led to the erroneous 
amalgamation of claims into this non-justiciable area. Treaty settlement claims are being brought 
not by the negotiating parties themselves, but by those who are affected by the Crown's settlement 
with another iwi. What is being challenged is the Crown's process of interaction with those groups 
who do not have a direct or effective voice in the negotiation process.  
On this view it becomes much more difficult for the courts to claim inability to review on the 
ground that these decisions are non-justiciable. The Waitangi Tribunal has acknowledged that 
despite the unique Treaty of Waitangi context, the decisions made by OTS remain part of an 
"administrative process".169 To review such interactions would simply be to review the procedures 
and decision-making processes of the Crown – something the courts are very experienced at doing. 
The entire area of judicial review is founded on the courts reviewing the decision-making processes 
of government. The fact that the courts have this power is now widely accepted. While difficulties 
arise if one takes a narrow ultra vires interpretation of the justification for judicial review,170 if a 
broader common law model approach is taken the courts have the power to review the actions of the 
executive wherever they appear to be inconsistent with the principles of good administration.171 
Under the common law model, "[u]nless Parliament clearly intends otherwise, the common law will 
require decision-makers to apply the principles of good administration as developed by Judges in 
making their decisions."172  
If ultra vires action is no longer the sole focus of judicial review, review based on the principles 
of good administration can then extend to areas such as Treaty settlement negotiations where there 
is no governing statute and the process is controlled entirely by policy and political management. 
This is consistent with the general trends set by other developments in judicial review, such as the 
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control of the actions of state-owned enterprises and other entities not traditionally considered 
within the Executive.173 Furthermore, the outcomes of such intervention will be largely positive:174 
The procedural controls of judicial review may limit the executive's flexibility in how it exercises its 
power without necessarily limiting its ultimate power. Such judicial supervision serves to ensure 
increased participation and greater transparency in executive decision-making. It is a mechanism by 
which to call the executive to account.  
This must be qualified with a dash of realism. Overlapping claimants are most often challenging 
the Crown's decision to offer particular sites to the iwi in negotiations. Such challenges go beyond 
the process by which to the decision is made to the heart of the decision itself. Such decisions are of 
the nature of policy formation. Nonetheless, such decisions affect other iwi immensely, potentially 
leading to iwi, hapū or whānau losing access to sites of irreplaceable cultural significance. 
Ironically, in most cases it is the decision-maker's failure to recognise and take account of the 
polycentric nature of the issues before them that represents the core of the parties' criticism. The 
grievance is founded in the failure of the decision-maker to recognise that more than one group's 
interests must be taken into account in making decisions about settlement redress. This initial failure 
results in the further omission to take into consideration the prejudice that may be suffered by other 
claimants as a result of the decision. So while it cannot be denied the claims made do stray onto the 
shore of the dark waters of political decisions, it remains the process of the decisions that is the 
focus of the challenge. 
Concerns about mandate have been approached in varying ways, and historically many cases 
were brought against the mandated bodies themselves rather than the Crown. More recent claims 
brought in the Waitangi Tribunal illustrate a much more process focused approach. They 
demonstrate concern about the process followed by the Crown when recognising that a group has 
the mandate to settle the claims of a smaller iwi, hapū or whānau. The central matter is whether in 
the process of decision-making decision-makers are recognising certain factual considerations. This 
is both when making their initial decision, and on an ongoing basis where groups attempt to 
withdraw their support for the mandated representatives. Although less clear-cut than overlapping 
claim issues, issues of mandate can be framed in process terms without substantially compromising 
the claimant's concerns. In fact mandate issues may be easier to frame in this way as at their core 
such claims are about administrative process, and they do not require the determination of claims to 
substantive rights or interests.  
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The vast majority of the cases being brought before the courts actually deal with issues of 
executive decision-making process. Increasingly claimants are pointing to examples of the Crown 
not only acting in a manner inconsistent with the principles of good administration, but actually 
going further and bringing what appear to be well-founded claims that the Crown has acted in bad 
faith.175  
Precedents such as Milroy have shaped an "easy-out" for the courts, giving rise to a situation 
where judges are carrying around this "portable palm tree" of "political process" or "policy 
formation" and all hope of seeing any further "articulated principle" has been lost. The courts have 
failed to discern the development that has occurred in the cases that have been brought before them, 
neglecting to recognise the distinctions between challenges "which essentially involve policy and 
are subject to a ratification process and the political process",176 and those challenges which involve 
the review of peripheral decisions that are not directly part of the legislative development process. 
Watene v Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations (Watene) is an example of the 
court failing to make this distinction:177 
The system that the Crown has established to take account, recognise and protect the hapu and their 
interests in the proposed settlement and subsequent creation of a governance entity, are the results of a 
political process involving decisions based on questions of policy and matters requiring political 
judgment. Such political decisions are not amenable to the supervision of the Court in the absence of 
clear evidence of fraud or the like. What the plaintiffs essentially seek therefore is to interfere in the 
political process. 
To say the Crown has established a system, but then decline jurisdiction on the ground that it is 
simply part of the political process is inconsistent. If the Executive has created a process to settle 
such claims, it is the responsibility of the courts to ensure that the Executive stays within the 
boundaries it has set. An advertised process creates a legitimate expectation on the part of iwi, hapū 
and whānau, and the Executive should not be allowed to contravene this expectation without good 
reason.178 To do otherwise would be "unfair and inconsistent with good administration".179 In the 
case of mandating, OTS has advertised its process in the Red Book, through publicly available 
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evidence given in earlier Waitangi Tribunal hearings, and also in separate information provided to 
claimants who enter discussions with OTS.180 Similarly with its policy on overlapping claims, OTS 
has advertised aspects of its process in the Red Book, extensively expanded on and developed its 
process in evidence and submissions responding to Waitangi Tribunal reports, and has also provided 
information to claimants (both those in negotiations and overlapping claimants). 181  Where 
information is not available or is inconsistent, as has been an ongoing criticism of the overlapping 
claims process in particular, concerns arise about transparency, certainty and effective active 
protection. This raises questions of inconsistency.182  
There is a failure on the part of the Crown to take into account what cannot be anything other 
than mandatory relevant considerations where decisions have been made about which sites to 
include in settlements without informed consideration of overlapping interests. The absence of a 
statutory source of power should not be a bar to the enforcement of such an obviously fundamental 
consideration, particularly as OTS has itself recognised the relevance of the protection of the 
interests of overlapping claimants.183  
Although the courts cannot look at the weight given to individual considerations, 184  the 
assessment of whether a consideration has been taken into account would necessarily involve an 
evaluation of whether the information relied on was sufficient to inform the decision-maker.185 This 
may extend into an evaluation of natural justice and the right to appropriate and meaningful 
consultation. Most of the information necessary to make such decisions on an informed basis could 
only be available to OTS after meaningful consultation with overlapping claimants. 
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Unreasoned declarations that issues are non-justiciable raise serious questions of access to 
justice. Claimants are refused access to the courts, yet the judges determining this are often applying 
broad precedents without close analysis of the applicability of the precedents to the claims before 
them.  
D Judicial Impact Analysis  
A judicial impact analysis cannot be undertaken here due to the courts' lack of involvement. But 
the prospect of such an analysis raises the interesting and important question about what a 
successful judicial review of the Treaty settlement process would seek to achieve. Feldman has 
broken the techniques of judicial control into three main streams:186 
(a) Directing. The traditional judicial function of compelling government to adhere to stated legal 
powers and duties. 
(b) Limiting. Establishing the scope of, or setting the limits to the exercise of, discretion. For example, 
the common law rules against delegation and fettering of powers. 
(c) Structuring. Making explicit values or goals which are to guide decision-making. This takes in 
common law principles of legality such as Wednesbury unreasonableness and the duty to act fairly. 
In Treaty settlement litigation the greatest concern is repeated bureaucratic inadequacies 
resulting in a failure to protect the interests of individuals and groups not (or inadequately) 
represented at the negotiating table. While directing is important in the short-term, the real benefit of 
judicial review is the opportunity for the court to structure decision-making around more sustainable 
and effective processes.187 Structuring is the most invasive and controlling form of review, as it 
seeks to actually alter administrators' day-to-day activities in a prospective manner.188 Yet it is also 
the most effective. In areas such as this where there is evidence of repeated bureaucratic failure it is 
the only form of redress that will provide ongoing protection from prejudicial Crown actions. As 
long as this is done in a manner that equates to establishing minimum standards for protection rather 
than the court actually developing the Crown's policy, then such a judicial response is entirely 
consistent with concepts such as Parliamentary sovereignty and separation of powers. 
VI CONCLUSION  
As illustrated by this discussion, issues of justiciability are intertwined with constitutional issues 
and the question of the appropriate place for issues to be reviewed. If the courts refuse to hear a 
claim on the ground that the issues it raises are non-justiciable, they are implicitly holding that the 
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issues should be determined in another arena (most often the political arena). One must therefore 
confront the questions raised by Griffith's notion of political constitutionalism: claims to inherent 
rights are simply political claims and thus should be dealt with in the political arena rather than by 
an un-elected, unaccountable judiciary.189 Flowing from this is the inevitable need to meet head-on 
the reality that administrative law and politics are closely intertwined and even co-dependent.190 
Administrative law must respond to the changing conception of the State. The Treaty settlement 
area is an excellent example of the need for flexibility and a judiciary that is conscious of the 
requirement of development that is responsive to an ever-changing changing political and social 
reality.191 
The Treaty of Waitangi context adds a further unique and complex dimension to these debates. 
If the Treaty is a political compact between indigenous peoples and the Crown, is it appropriate for 
the courts to be making determinations on the interpretation of this compact? Conversely, surely it is 
the role of our independent judiciary to protect the interests of minorities, and in particular to protect 
the inherent rights of Māori as the indigenous peoples of New Zealand?  
The argument can and has been made that these are simply "political questions"192 and therefore 
should be left to the political forms of accountability. Academics such as Matthew Palmer warn 
against the judicialisation of issues of indigenous rights:193 
The issues are inherently and intensely political. The demographics and political power of Maori suggest 
to many New Zealanders that the position of Maori is strong enough that national conversations about 
these issues should be held in the political arena – between people who understand policy and politics, 
principle and pragmatism – not judges. 
Despite inevitable concern about the foreshore and seabed debate, Palmer argues that it has 
resulted in positive changes as views were aired and a necessary public debate occurred.194 He 
argues that it has resulted in a "greater political interest in seeking constructive solutions to Treaty 
issues." 195  Maybe the response to Palmer's idealism lies in the Government's response to the 
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criticism in recent Waitangi Tribunal reports. This response will provide significant insight into the 
ability of New Zealand politics to reach constructive and fair solutions.196  
The Māori renaissance in the late 1960s and 1970s exposed the political strength of Māori. 
Demographic trends indicate that the importance of the Māori vote is likely to increase dramatically 
in coming decades.197 Combined with the formation of the Māori Party in 2004, it would appear the 
Māori voice is of increasing force. On the other hand, the now infamous political response to the 
case of Ngati Apa v Attorney-General revealed that this force is not as powerful as many 
envisioned.198 There the government unilaterally extinguished all customary rights to the foreshore 
and seabed and replaced them with a statutory scheme for recognition.199 The foreshore and seabed 
debate illustrated that the political strength of Māori has declined since its height in the 1980s and 
1990s. New Zealand's response led commentators who had previously had faith in the New Zealand 
political process to comment:200 
Healthy relationships require healthy dialogue: honesty, trust, respect, good faith, careful sensitivity, a 
willingness to apologize when offence is given, and a willingness, eventually, to accept an apology and 
to move on to a new depth of understanding. This is not what I saw in New Zealand's debate about the 
foreshore and seabed. It was vituperative and destructive and elements of it were racist. It shook my 
faith in the ability of New Zealand politics to deal, maturely, calmly and reasonably, with issues of high 
profile policy and national identity. 
If attempts in the political arena are unsuccessful, the obvious alternative forum for Māori 
concerned about prejudice resulting from Crown actions is the Waitangi Tribunal. This is a forum 
increasingly utilised by Māori to deal with contemporary issues. 201  However, the weight of 
Waitangi Tribunal recommendations rests entirely on the credibility of the recommendations and the 
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extent of political buy-in from those to whom the recommendations are directed.202  As shown 
above, historically such buy-in has been lacking, leaving claimants without an effective remedy.203 
This leads to anxiety resulting from the Crown's failure to respond to recommendations by an 
established specialist tribunal. There is also further fear that this illustrates a general lack of 
responsiveness to Māori concerns about the Treaty settlement process. If Māori are given no 
opportunity to be heard in the courts, and the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal are not 
being heeded, the issue remains whether Māori can gain an effective remedy where serious breaches 
of the Treaty of Waitangi occur. 
These concerns are reinforced in the failure of other accountability mechanisms put in place to 
protect Māori. An instance of this is the failure of the Crown to meet its statutory obligations under 
section 8I of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. Under that provision the Minister of Māori Affairs is 
obliged to report annually to the House of Representatives on implementation of Waitangi Tribunal 
recommendations. This is supposed to form an important political accountability mechanism. It is to 
ensure that serious weight and consideration is given to all recommendations of the Waitangi 
Tribunal by forcing the Executive to publicly justify its decision to reject a recommendation. Earlier 
this year it became public that since 1995 the Crown had consistently failed to present a report to the 
House.204 A report was drafted in 2004 but it was not presented to the House.205 While an updating 
report has now been presented to Parliament, it lacks much of the detail of earlier implementation 
reports and is of little practical use.206 
This illustrates that it is far from acceptable for the courts to take it for granted that other 
remedies are available to claimants. The current political climate in New Zealand means that both 
the Waitangi Tribunal and normal political channels often provide little meaningful recourse for 
claimants who face potentially irreversible prejudice. It is necessary for the courts to respond to the 
realities of the political situation and ensure the democratic ideals of access to justice and 
representation endure in practice. Even if the political arena is considered to be the ideal forum for 
such issues, the overarching principles of New Zealand's constitution make it imperative that the 
courts respond to needs being left without alternative redress. 
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To have the court making judgment calls as to the effectiveness of the political arena and the 
Waitangi Tribunal is prima facie undesirable within New Zealand's constitutional structure, and 
therefore such determinations should be reserved for clear cases where claimants are suffering 
repeated breach through obvious failures to gain redress. This should not become a broad mandate 
for the court to analyse the government's political response mechanisms. However, Treaty 
settlement is an example of an area where such determinations could and should be made. The 
seriousness of the issues raised, combined with the flagrant failure of the political arena to respond, 
should compel the courts to intervene. The use of litigation by indigenous groups can be an effective 
means of inducing governmental action. Once a binding judgment is delivered the government can 
respond with a substantially reduced risk of negative political consequences.207 The courts have the 
power to do this without actually determining the nature of the settlement redress, which is a 
significant advantage over the use of the Waitangi Tribunal's binding recommendatory powers. 
Unquestionably the Treaty of Waitangi will continue to provide New Zealand with difficult and 
complex questions for some time yet. Many of the issues facing Māori today will continue past the 
settlement of Treaty claims. Therefore, it remains essential to ask where issues faced by Māori 
should be aired, and where effective remedies can be sought and provided. Accountability is 
particularly important in the area of Treaty settlements as flawed processes will result in further 
prejudice to Māori making the settlement of claims pointless and potentially never-ending.  
This article has sought to provide a detailed analysis of the treatment of Treaty of Waitangi 
settlement claims within the New Zealand context. Despite the fact that there are three main arenas 
open to Māori, it is clear that some Māori who are suffering very real and lasting prejudice are 
failing to gain an effective remedy. While the failure of the political arena, and as a result the 
limited value of the Waitangi Tribunal, leads to very real apprehension and disappointment, the 
failure of the courts to respond to these cases raises serious concerns about access to justice.  
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